In traditional thinking, an arbitrageur will trade immediately once an arbitrage opportunity appears. Is this the best strategy for the arbitrageur or it is even better to wait for the best time to trade so as to achieve the maximum profit? To answer this question, this paper studies the optimal trading strategies of an arbitrageur in a dynamic economy where the arbitrageur's trades affect prices, and the arbitrageur faces competition from other arbitrageurs exploiting the same mispricings. The proposed model considers fixed and proportional transaction costs, and closed form expressions for the threshold values in the optimal policies are provided. The theoretical and numerical results answer how the timing of the trade and the trade size depend on the magnitudes of the fixed and proportional transaction costs, the dynamics of the arbitrage opportunity, the interest rate, the market impact, and the level of competition. Furthermore, this study numerically studies how the trading horizon and the trader's risk attitude affect the arbitrageurs' decision. With competition, the start-to-trade threshold approaches the proportional cost. Our paper provides a new perspective on the existing empirical literature testing for the existence of arbitrage opportunities.
Introduction
It is well known that limited arbitrage opportunities can exist in competitive markets due to market frictions such as transaction costs (see Barles and Soner [2] , Cvitanic, Pham and Touze [10] , Jouini and Kallal [19] , and Soner, Shreve and Cvitanic [30] ), short sale restrictions (see Lamont and Thaler [21] and Ofek, Richardson and Whitelaw [26] ), collateral/margin requirements (see Broadie, Cvitanic and Soner [6] , Basak and Croitoru [3] , Cuoco and Liu [9] , and Naik and Uppal [24] ), solve the problem. The second paper considers a portfolio selection problem with quadratic trading costs (also explained as temporary price impact) based on a mean-variance framework. The main conclusion is that the investor aims to a target portfolio, but trades only partially towards the objective due to the existence of transaction costs.
As compared to the discrete-time models, the continuous-time model is also commonly considered to tackle finance problems, due to its flexibility by allowing trading at any time. A continuoustime model for portfolio management is studied by He and Mamaysky [15] , who consider a finite horizon problem with proportional price impact and transactions costs. Both risk-neutral and riskaverse preferences are studied and optimal strategies are numerically obtained without closed form expressions.
In our paper, the continuous-time model is used to obtain the optimal control strategy in closed form for exploiting arbitrage opportunities with market impact and transaction costs. More specifically, this study first solves the problem in a monopolistic setting, and then, extends this case to incorporate competition. In either setting, the optimal policies are derived with closed form expressions for the threshold values to perform transactions. Comparative statics are explored related to how the threshold values change with the interest rate, the market impact, the magnitude of transactions costs, the dynamics of the arbitrage opportunity, and the level of competition.
In our impulse control model, fixed and proportional transaction costs are considered. The corresponding derived profit function is an atypical nonlinear function. Methodologically our study provides closed form expressions for these nonlinear functions, which, to the best of our knowledge, have never been studied before.
The results obtained herein are in contrast to the standard textbook arbitrage trading strategy (see Duffie [13] and Jarrow and Turnbull [18] ) that generates infinite wealth. Instead, arbitrageurs' expected discounted trading profits are finite and it is rational for arbitrageurs not to trade immediately when the arbitrage opportunity's value exceeds its proportional transaction cost. In addition, our results show that both the magnitude and the time that the arbitrageur starts to trade depend on the level of competition. Our paper has important implications for the empirical literature testing for the existence of arbitrage opportunities. Violations of this condition have been taken to be proof of an inefficient market. Our paper shows that this conclusion might be false, because with market impacts, the non-exploitation of arbitrage opportunities that exceed the "transaction cost" band can be an optimal trading strategy for the arbitrageur. In this regard, the implications of the empirical literature investigating the efficiency of financial markets might need to be revisited and perhaps additional tests performed.
An outline for this paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the model structure. Section 3 studies an economy where competitive arbitrageurs are not explicitly modeled. In this section, closed form solutions are presented and the intuition is illustrated through numerically. In addition, the problem when there are trading constraints is studied. Furthermore, sensitivity analysis and the financial insights are explored. Section 4 adds competing arbitrageurs to the economy and compares the optimal strategies with those in Section 3. In Section 5, a finite horizon problem with risk attitude is explored. Section 6 provides a conclusion.
The Model
In this study, an infinite horizon and continuous trading economy is considered. An infinite horizon model is reasonable since the arbitrageur is often a hedge fund or financial institution.
For analytic convenience and for clarity of the insights, we focus on a particular arbitrage opportunity available to the arbitrageurs. To exploit this arbitrage opportunity, arbitrageurs buy or sell a traded security and hold an offsetting position in a replicating portfolio. The simplest example is where there are two identical securities trading at different prices: buy the one with the lower price and sell the one with the higher price. Another example is the existence of an over-priced call option: sell the call and delta hedge with the underlying stock.
Let X t denote the arbitrage opportunity's value, which measures the magnitude of the mispricing, per unit transaction at time t. For instance, if an arbitrageur buys a security for q t dollars and sells it in another market for p t dollars at time t, then the arbitrage opportunity's value is X t = p t − q t . More generally, if the arbitrage opportunity needs a dynamic trading strategy to exploit, then X t represents the present value (at time t) of the profit generated by this trading strategy. Since we are considering an arbitrage opportunity, a unit trade is defined to be that quantity of the relevant securities for which bid and ask prices are quoted. For example, when trading an arbitrage opportunity's value involving stocks, the trading unit is one round lot or 100 shares.
In order to characterize the evolution of the arbitrage opportunity's value, we let Ω be the space of all real valued continuous functions ω : [0, ∞) → R andW = {W t } t≥0 be a standard Brownian motion defined on the filtered probability space (Ω, F, (F t ) t≥0 , P ) satisfying the usual conditions (see [28] ), where P is a probability measure, F t is the natural filtration generated byW , and F is the smallest σ−field of Ω such that F t ⊆ F for all t ≥ 0. We assume that the arbitrage opportunity's value evolves as follows:
where b : R → R, σ : R → R, σ(x) > 0 for all x, z is the jump size, and N (dt, dz) is the jump measure.
Note here that in (1) we do not restrict the arbitrage opportunity's value to be non-negative.
There are two interesting cases. If trades in exploiting the arbitrage opportunity are completely unrestricted, then one can impose the condition that X t ≥ 0 for all t, because arbitrageurs can just change the sign of the position and turn negative profits into positive profits. In some circumstances, however, there are restrictions such as short sale constraints or collateral requirements, and arbitrageurs can only take one direction of a trade. For this fixed direction, the trade could sometimes generate negative profits as in [22] . Our general form of expression (1) applies to both cases.
The evolution of the arbitrage opportunity's value in (1) is determined by all market participants except our arbitrageur. In this regard, we take a partial equilibrium perspective. That is, if there are other arbitrageurs in the market, what the arbitrageur sees is the "remaining" arbitrage opportunity available to him. As such, competing arbitrageurs are implicitly included in the assumed evolution.
The Assumptions
For mispricings to exist in equilibrium, we need to include market frictions, among which we focus on transactions costs, assuming that each trade involves both a proportional cost (c per unit traded) and a fixed cost (c 0 per transaction) as shown in Assumption 1. These transaction costs include set-up costs, transaction fees (bid/ask spreads), and the holding costs similarly described in [31] . It is well known that in a model which does not consider market impact, an arbitrageur will trade infinite units whenever the arbitrage opportunity's value exceeds the proportional cost and obtain infinite profit. However, when there are market impact and transaction costs, the above situation might change. In fact, when the arbitrageur trades, the arbitrage opportunity's value is reduced. In this study, the market impact of a transaction is characterized by the following assumption.
Assumption 2. (Market Impact) When the arbitrageur trades v units at time τ − , his market impact reduces the arbitrage opportunity's value to
where θ > 0 is a constant, and X τ − := lim t→τ,t<τ X t .
Note here that in the above assumption, after the arbitrageur trades a positive v units, the mispricing declines by a positive factor e −θv < 1. This assumption is reasonable since selling securities decreases the securities' prices and buying securities increases the corresponding prices.
So the arbitrageur's trade, usually including both selling and buying the corresponding securities, decreases the arbitrage opportunity's value. After the trade, the arbitrage opportunity's value jumps downwards, and evolves as in equation (1) until the arbitrageur's next possible transaction. arbitrage opportunity's value X τ − , after considering his market impact, the total revenue generated
Similar settings are also adopted in [15] to study portfolio management with price impacts.
Thus, the profit from a transaction at time τ with a trading quantity v is revenue minus transaction costs, which is
Assumption 4. (Interest Rate) The compound interest rate r > 0 is a constant.
The Optimization Problem
The arbitrageur's transaction decisions are a sequence of F t −stopping times (τ 1 , τ 2 , . . .) and corre-
where τ k ≤ τ k+1 and v k ≥ 0, k = 1, 2, .... We denote the set of all such transaction decisions as W . Note here that, from equations (1) and (2), for a given trading strategy w, the evolution of the arbitrage opportunity's value is
where τ i and v i are the time and quantity of the i th transaction for i = 1, 2, ....
For a given trading strategy w ∈ W , the arbitrageur's expected discounted profit at time t, corresponding to the current arbitrage opportunity's value at x, is
To maximize the expected discounted profit J w (t, x), the arbitrageur tries to find the optimal trading strategy w ∈ W , i.e.,
For the moment, this completes the model's description. Additional extensions will be discussed in subsequent sections.
Optimal Trading Policies without Competitors
In this section, we discuss the case when the arbitrageur does not have competitors. We first consider the case when there is no restriction on trade. Accordingly, the arbitrage opportunity's values are nonnegative and assumed to follow a geometric Brownian motion (GBM), i.e.,
where the drift speed b and volatility σ > 0 are constants, and the noise term W t is a standard Brownian motion on the filtered probability space (Ω, F, (F t ) t≥0 , P ).
The Threshold Policy
We first consider an extreme case, where b ≥ r, and show that it is optimal to wait forever in this circumstance.
Theorem 1. Suppose the arbitrageur is only allowed to trade once. If the drift term b > r, then it is optimal to wait forever and the expected profit is infinite. If the drift term b = r, then the optimal policy is also to wait forever, but with a finite expected profit.
Proof. The proof is given in Appendix A.1
Because the condition on the drift, b ≥ r, generates cases inconsistent with any economic equilibrium, in the following we only discuss the case where b < r.
To derive the optimal threshold policy for this case, we first guess that the value function φ(t, x)
is separable in t and x, and described as φ(t, x) = e −rt ψ(x).
Second, we guess there exists a threshold trading policy. More specifically, we trade when the arbitrage opportunity's value x reaches y 2 and trade the amount such that arbitrage opportunity's value decreases to y 1 , i.e., the optimal trading quantity is v * = [ln(y 2 ) − ln(y 1 )] /θ. Accordingly, the continuation region takes the form C = {x : x < y 2 }.
Furthermore, we guess the value function is
where
, and y 1 , y 2 , and K are decided in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. For any c > 0, c 0 > 0, θ > 0, and γ > 1, there exists a unique group of (y 1 , y 2 , K),
and
Proof. The proof is given in Appendix A.2.
Next, we show that the chosen y 1 , y 2 , and K guarantee that the guessed function ψ(x) is optimal. We first show that this function ψ(x) is smooth.
Note that ψ(x) is smooth in x if and only if ψ(x) is smooth at x = y 2 (i.e., ψ(x) is continuous at x = y 2 and its left and right derivatives are equal at x = y 2 ), which requires
By dividing θ on both sides and reorganizing the terms in (11), (12) is satisfied. Similarly, by dividing θy 2 on both sides of (10), we have that (13) is satisfied.
Then, in the following main theorem, we verify the guessed function is optimal by proving that it satisfies the Verification Theorems 7 and 8 we developed in Appendix A.3. 
, and K are as in Proposition 1 with γ * replacing γ. Accordingly, the optimal trading strategy is to wait until the arbitrage opportunity's value x reaches y 2 , and then to transact such that x decreases to y 1 , i.e., the optimal trading quantity is
Proof. First of all, we know that, based on (7), the generator of the diffusion process X t is:
And the switch operator
Following (14), A(φ(t, x)) = A(e −rt ψ(x)) = e −rt A 0 (ψ(x)), where 
Time Evolution of the arbitrage opportunity's value Figure 1 : Optimal transaction times for a sample path of the arbitrage opportunity's value
, where
The choice of y 1 , y 2 , and K guarantee that ψ(x) is smooth for x. In order to show that the guessed value function and trading policy are optimal, based on Theorems 7 and 8 in Appendix A.3, it suffices to verify that the following conditions are satisfied:
The detailed proof is given in Appendix A.4.
Discussion
In this subsection, we explore the intuition and discuss our theoretical results. In particular,
we show how to perform transactions based on the threshold policies derived from the previous subsections and we explore the start-to-trade threshold and trading amounts, plus their impacts on the arbitrage opportunity's value, as compared to the traditional approach.
Graphic Illustration and Numerical Experiments
To understand the intuition behind Theorem 2, a graph on the evolution of the arbitrage opportunity's value is presented in Figure 1 . In the graph the jagged line is a realized scenario of the arbitrage opportunity's value X t . The proportional transaction cost c, the start-to-trade threshold y 2 , and the trade down-to target y 1 are illustrated in the vertical axis. The optimal arbitrage trading strategy is, whenever arbitrage opportunity's value reaches the start-to-trade threshold y 2 , to trade such that the arbitrage opportunity's value decreases to y 1 . In addition, in this sample scenario , the first trade happens at time τ 1 . Due to its market impact, the transaction makes the arbitrage opportunity's value drop down to y 1 . After the decline, the arbitrage opportunity's value continues evolving, until time τ 2 when the start-to-trade threshold is reached again and another transaction occurs, and so on.
A further illustration of the optimal policy for a numerical example is shown in Figure 2 . In the figure, the optimal arbitrage opportunity's value after trading (trade-down-to target) and the optimal expected trading profit ψ(x) versus the arbitrage opportunity's value before trading x are increasing, convex, and smooth at the start-to-trade threshold.
Comparison to a Myopic Strategy
It is worthwhile demonstrating the benefit of our proposed optimal trading strategy, as compared to the commonly used myopic strategy which maximizes the current transaction profit. and c and the current arbitrage opportunity's value x, if the arbitrageur trades (which accordingly makes the arbitrage opportunity's value decreased to y = xe −θv following (2)), then from (4), the profit is
. So there is no trading action when x ≤ c, and when x > c, the myopic optimal solution is y myop 1 = c and the corresponding profit is
Since the above myopic profit function P myop (x) is increasing in x, the myopic start-to-trade threshold y myop 2 can be defined as the point such that
That is, y myop 2 is the arbitrage opportunity's value above which the arbitrageur can start to make positive profit.
Proposition 2. The optimal start-to-trade threshold y 2 is strictly larger than the myopic start-to-
, which is strictly larger than the proportional transaction cost c.
Proof. The proof is given in Appendix A.5.
From the above analysis, the optimal start-to-trade threshold y 2 is strictly larger than the myopic threshold y myop
2
. Meanwhile, the optimal trade-down-to target y 1 is strictly larger than the proportional transaction cost c. All of these generate a higher probability of a larger arbitrage opportunity's value in the future for our optimal trading strategy, as compared to the myopic one.
In other words, when the arbitrage opportunity's value is above the myopic threshold y myop 2 but below the optimal start-to-trade threshold y 2 , no transaction occurs, which indicates that it is rational not to exploit the arbitrage opportunity as soon as trading is profitable. Furthermore, for realistic drifts (i.e., b < r), the arbitrageur's total expected discounted profit from trading is finite.
These results contradict the standard textbook characterization of the arbitrage trading strategy, where without market impact and with transaction cost, the arbitrageur trades infinite units and gets infinite profits once the arbitrage opportunity's value exceeds the proportional transaction cost.
Trading Restrictions
As discussed in Section 2, in some circumstances when there are trading restrictions, the arbitrageur can only exploit one direction of arbitrage opportunity. Under this situation, the arbitrage opportunity's value could be negative. In this case a Brownian motion model can be utilized to capture the evolution of arbitrage opportunity's value, which can be described as follows:
where b and σ > 0 are constants, and W t is a standard Brownian motion on the filtered probability space (Ω, F, (F t ) t≥0 , P ) as described in Section 2. The optimal trading strategy also exists (shown below in Theorem 3) and the corresponding threshold values are decided following Proposition 3. 
, and K are as in Proposition 3 with γ BM replacing γ. Accordingly, the optimal trading strategy is to wait until the arbitrage opportunity's value x reaches y 2 , and then to transact such that x decreases to y 1 , i.e., the optimal trading quantity is
Proof. The proof is similar to that for Theorem 2 and so is omitted.
Proposition 3. For any c > 0, c 0 > 0, θ > 0, and γ > 0, there exists a unique group of (y 1 , y 2 , K), with c < y 1 < c + 1/γ < y 2 and K > 0, such that
Proof. The proof is similar to that for Proposition 1 and so is omitted.
Since the above theorem's representation is analogous to Theorem 2, no further explanation is provided. Since BM model generates similar insights, from now on, we will focus on GBM model.
Sensitivity Analysis
In this subsection, we explore a sensitivity analysis of the basic parameters such as the proportional and fixed transaction costs, the interest rate, the market impact parameter, and the drift and volatility terms of the evolution of the arbitrage opportunity's value. The conditions described in Theorem 2 are assumed to hold for this analysis.
Proportional Transaction Cost
We explore how the proportional transaction cost affects the two thresholds, including qualitative and quantitative analyses and the corresponding financial interpretations. The qualitative analysis is provided in the following proposition. 
Fixed Transaction Cost
Similarly, we explore qualitative and quantitative analyses on how the fixed transaction cost affects the two thresholds. The qualitative analysis is provided in the following proposition.
Proposition 5. As the fixed transaction cost c 0 increases, the trade-down-to target y 1 decreases while the start-to-trade threshold y 2 increases.
Proof. The proof is given in Appendix A.7.
With a larger fixed transaction cost, the arbitrageur needs to gain more revenue per trade, and so the arbitrageur waits a longer time to trade (corresponding to a higher y 2 ) and trades more at each transaction (corresponding to a lower y 1 ). The quantitative analysis is given in the right graph of Figure 3 From the graph, we find that when c 0 goes to 0, y 1 and y 2 coincide. 
. Accordingly, the optimal trading strategy is to wait until the arbitrage opportunity's value
x is higher than y 2 , and then to transact such that x decreases to y 2 .
Proof. The detailed proof is given in Appendix A.8.
From the above analysis, the start-to-trade threshold and trade-down-to target coincide and are both strictly larger than c. Accordingly, the start-to-trade threshold y 2 acts like a reflecting barrier.
Finally, if both the fixed and proportional transaction costs are 0, we have y 1 = y 2 = 0, which means it is optimal to trade immediately when there is positive arbitrage opportunity. This is the traditional textbook arbitrage trading strategy. However, this strategy only generates a finite profit since there is market impact.
Market Impact
In this part, we explore how market impact affects the two thresholds. First, the qualitative analysis is provided in the following proposition.
Proposition 6. As market impact parameter θ increases, the trade-down-to target value y 1 decreases while the start-to-trade threshold value y 2 increases. When θ = 0, it is obvious that the optimal trading strategy is to trade infinite units as soon as x > c and it becomes the standard textbook solution which generates infinite wealth by exploiting this arbitrage opportunity.
The Interest Rate
The interest rate also affects the two thresholds. The qualitative analysis is provided in the following proposition.
Proposition 7.
As the interest rate r increases, both the start-to-trade threshold and the tradedown-to target values y 2 and y 1 decrease.
Proof. The proof is given in Appendix A.10. 
The Drift Speed
In this part, qualitative and quantitative analyses on how the drift speed affects the two thresholds are explored. The qualitative analysis is provided in the following proposition. Proof. The proof is given in Appendix A.11.
From the above analysis, it can be observed that if the drift term of the arbitrage opportunity's value increases, which means that after trading the arbitrage opportunity's value returns to a higher level sooner, the arbitrageur sets a higher threshold for trading in order to obtain a larger profit per 
The Volatility
In this part, we explore how the volatility affects the two thresholds. The qualitative analysis is provided in the following proposition.
Proposition 9.
As the volatility σ increases, both the start-to-trade threshold and the trade-down-to target values y 2 and y 1 increase.
Proof. The proof is given in Appendix A.12.
If the volatility of the arbitrage opportunity's value increases, which means the arbitrage opportunity's value becomes higher with an increased probability, the arbitrageur again tends to set a higher trading threshold. The corresponding quantitative analysis is given in the right graph of In sum, with higher transaction costs, larger market impact, lower interest rate, higher profit return (drift), or larger volatility, the arbitrageur becomes more patient and sets a larger start-totrade threshold, which could be much higher than the proportional transaction cost and significantly violates the traditional textbook arbitrage trading strategy. However, when competitors join in, this changes. We discuss this case in the following section.
Optimal Trading Policies with Competitors
In the previous analysis, competing arbitrageurs are implicitly captured in the arbitrage opportunity's value evolution available to our arbitrageur. Under the given market structure, we see that our arbitrageur's trades cause a discontinuity in the arbitrage opportunity's value's evolution.
It seems natural that, if there are competing arbitrageurs, then their trades would cause similar discontinuities in the arbitrage opportunity's values available to our arbitrageur. Yet, this is inconsistent with the continuous sample path arbitrage evolution contained in (7) . Hence, to have the arbitrage opportunity's value evolution consistent with competing arbitrageurs, the arbitrage opportunity's value evolution needs to include unanticipated downward jumps in its evolution. 1 Thus, in this section, our study starts with the GBM plus jump model where the jump intensity is independent of the jump size and arbitrage opportunity's value and the downward jump size is proportional to the magnitude of the arbitrage opportunity's value. The optimal threshold policy for this case is derived in Subsection 4.1. Accordingly, the comparison between the models with and without jumps is illustrated in Subsection 4.2 and the further insights on the relationship between threshold values and jump size/instensity are described in Subsection 4.3. Then, this study is further explored numerically in Subsection 4.4 to consider a more general setting where the jump intensity is proportional to the arbitrage opportunity's value.
The Threshold Policy
Following the above description, to illustrate the impact of competing arbitrageurs, in this part, a compounded Poisson process is utilized to model the jumps. Meanwhile, the assumption of the downward jump size to be proportional to the magnitude of the arbitrage opportunity's value follows the intuition that the competitors are likely to trade more, when the arbitrage opportunity's value is high. With this consideration in mind, the arbitrage opportunity's value evolves as a geometric Brownian motion with jumps, i.e.,
where b and σ > 0 are constants, B t is a standard Brownian motion on the filtered probability space (Ω, F, (F t ) t≥0 , P ), z is the relative jump size, and N (dt, dz) is the jump measure.
Under this evolution, the optimal trading strategy for .) ] is a Levy measure [27] , is as characterized in the following theorem.
Theorem 5. Suppose the arbitrageur is only allowed to trade once. If the drift term b+ 0 −1 zν(dz) > r, then it is optimal to wait forever and the expected profit is infinite. If the drift term b + 0 −1 zν(dz) = r, then the optimal policy is also to wait forever, but with a finite expected profit.
Proof. See Appendix A.13 for the detailed proof.
Because these two conditions on the drift generate trading strategies inconsistent with any economic equilibrium, in the following, we only discuss the remaining b + 0 −1 zν(dz) < r case.
Similar with the case without jumps, we guess that the value function φ d (t, x) is separable in t and x, and described as φ d (t, x) = e −rt ψ d (x). Second, we guess there exists a threshold trading policy. More specifically, we trade when the arbitrage opportunity's value x reaches y d 2 and trade the amount such that arbitrage opportunity's value decreases to y d 1 , i.e., the optimal trading quantity is
the continuation region takes the form C = {x :
Moreover, we guess the value function is
where γ * d is decided in Lemma 1 in Appendix A.14, and y Furthermore, we can prove that ψ d (x) is smooth at x = y d 2 implied by the following two equations:
where (24) follows from (11) and (25) follows from (10).
In the following theory, we verify that the guessed function is the value function and the trading strategy is optimal by proving that our guess satisfies the Verification Theorems 7 and 8 in Appendix A.3. 
where γ * d is decided in Lemma 1 in Appendix A.14, y d 1 , y d 2 , and K d are as in Proposition 1 with γ * d substituting γ. Accordingly, the optimal trading strategy is to wait until the arbitrage opportunity's value x reaches y d 2 , and then to transact such that x decreases to y d 1 , i.e., the optimal trading
The threshold policy is similar to that under monopoly setting except for different threshold values.
Comparison with and without Competitors
In this subsection, we compare the thresholds derived from the models with and without jumps, which correspondingly provide the optimal control policies for the cases with and without competitors.
Proposition 10. If the conditions of Theorem 2 hold, then compared to the case without downward jumps, both values for the threshold policy with jumps decrease, i.e., y d 1 < y 1 and y d 2 < y 2 , where
and (y 1 , y 2 ) are values for the optimal threshold policies for the cases with and without jumps respectively as described in Theorems 6 and 2.
Proof. See Appendix A.16 for the detailed proof.
Perhaps not surprising, the optimal strategy's thresholds decrease as compared to those in Theorem 2. The arbitrageur trades more quickly in fear that a jump down may occur, which would reduce or even eliminate profitable trades. Through numerical study, we further discuss the intuition in the next subsection.
Numerical Illustration
In this subsection, we conduct numerical experiments investigating how the jump size and the jump intensity affect the two trading thresholds. We assume that the jump size is independent of the jump intensity and for simplicity of illustration we assume that the relative jump size is a constant, i.e., Figure 6 gives the graphs of the optimal trade-down-to target as a function of the arbitrage opportunity's value for different relative jump sizes and intensities. The results follow our intuition. The bigger the relative jump size and the larger the jump intensity, the arbitrageur waits a shorter time between trades, i.e., the start-to-trade threshold is lower. 
Jump Size and Intensity Dependent on Arbitrage Opportunity's Value
In the above analysis, we assume that the jump intensity is independent of the arbitrage opportunity's value. In practice, the jump intensity can be dependent on the arbitrage opportunity's value.
For instance, when the arbitrage opportunity's values are high, competing arbitrageurs trade more (the downward jump size is larger) and downward jumps occur more frequently. To capture this consideration, we set the jump intensity to be proportional to the arbitrage opportunity's value. These experiments illustrate that with more competition, both the start-to-trade threshold and the trade-down-to target get closer to the proportional transaction cost. This indicates that with sufficiently large competition, arbitrageurs will trade as soon as trading becomes profitable, which is of course the classical solution. 
Finite Horizon Problems and Risk Attitude
In Sections 3 and 4, the theoretical analysis explored threshold policies for infinite horizon and risk-neutral arbitrageurs. In practice, arbitrageurs may have different risk attitudes and wealths.
In this section, we consider the finite horizon problem with risk attitude.
Finite Horizon
Finite horizon problems commonly exist in practice, such as arbitrage opportunities involving call options and its replicating portfolio. However, it is difficult to derive closed form optimal solutions for finite horizon stochastic control problems, because the value function is not separable in time t and arbitrage opportunity's value x. So we numerically solve the finite horizon problem and discuss the insights.
In the numerical experiment, the parameters are set as follows: r = 0. From the numerical study, the optimal trade-down-to target as a function of arbitrage opportunity's value at the current time is represented in the left graph in Figure 8 . These values actually match the ones for the infinite horizon case as described in Figure 2 . This result is not surprising, The optimal policy is still a (y 1 , y 2 ) policy but both values of y 1 and y 2 change with time.
More specifically, it is (y 1 (t), y 2 (t)) policy. The detailed two threshold values and the start-to-trade threshold and the trade-down-to target levels, as a function of time, are illustrated in the right graph in Figure 8 .
The interesting behavior is that with time close to the end of horizon, the start-to-trade thresholds first increase and then decrease. The intuition is: when there is some remaining time left, the arbitrageur can only trade very limited times before the end of the horizon. The arbitrageur needs to consider the tradeoff between the number of possible trades and the profit per trade, due to the market impact. Therefore, if the current arbitrage opportunity's value is not high enough and the arbitrageur trades now, although the arbitrageur can trade more times, the total profit might not be high, because the profit for each trade might be low. Thus the arbitrageur might prefer to wait (corresponding to a higher start-to-trade threshold value) and trade more units per trade (corresponding to a lower trade-down-to target value). Following this strategy, although the arbitrageur may trade less times, but with a higher arbitrage opportunity's value in each trade in the future, the arbitrageur may get a higher total profit.
Meanwhile, when it comes close to the end of horizon, the arbitrageur might be able to trade only once with a higher probability, and accordingly the arbitrageur becomes less patient (corresponding to a lower start-to-trade threshold) and finally trade as long as it is profitable, i.e., the start-to-trade value decided by the myopic policy.
Risk Attitude and Wealth Effects
The objective function incorporating risk attitude can lead to optimal trading strategies for arbitrageurs with different risk attitudes. To derive a precise model, one additional variable -wealth or money account M (t) at time t -is introduced, which leads to the following objective function expression:
where λ > 0 is the risk coefficient.
where the first term follows from the compound interest rate formula and the second term is the profit increment due to the arbitrageur's transaction.
In the numerical study, the parameters are set as r = 0. From Figure 9 , where the initial wealth is set to zero, by observing the optimal trade-down-to target versus the arbitrage opportunity's value at the current time with different risk coefficients including risk-averse (e.g., λ = 1/3 and λ = 2/3), risk-neutral (e.g., λ = 1), and risk-loving (λ = 4/3), we find the results to be intuitive. That is, the more risk averse the arbitrageur is (i.e., the smaller the λ value is), the sooner the arbitrageur will trade (i.e., the smaller the start-to-trade threshold). Based on the studies and discussions in the previous sections, in sum, the arbitrageur who first finds an arbitrage opportunity will not trade immediately when the trade is profitable. Instead, the arbitrageur waits until the arbitrage opportunity's value reaches a certain threshold, which could be significantly larger than that decided by traditional arbitrage theory. Later on, after competitors are observed, arbitrageurs decrease their start-to-trade thresholds. In addition, various lengths of horizons and arbitrageurs' risk attitudes and wealth on hand contribute to customized optimal trading strategies and further dynamics of arbitrage opportunity.
Conclusion
In this paper, we discuss the optimal trading strategies for an arbitrageur whose transactions incur transaction costs and affect the magnitude of the arbitrage opportunity, and where the arbitrageur may face potential competitors attempting to exploit the same arbitrage opportunity. Accordingly, in our models, we include fixed and proportional transaction costs, arbitrageur's market impact, and competition.
We start with the arbitrage trading problem with market impact in a monopoly environment, The derived optimal trading policy has a start-to-trade threshold and a trade-down-to target. It is optimal for an arbitrageur to wait until the arbitrage opportunity's value exceeds the start-to-trade threshold and then trade the amount such that the arbitrage opportunity's value decreases to the trade-down-to target. We provide closed form expressions for the threshold values and our proofs are self-contained.
In addition, our results reveal how the timing of the trade and the trade size depend on the magnitude of transactions costs, the dynamics of the arbitrage opportunity's value, the interest rate, the market impact, and the level of competition. Specifically, both the start-to-trade threshold and the trade-down-to target increase as the drift speed or the volatility or the proportional transaction cost increases; the start-to-trade threshold increases while the trade-down-to target decreases as the fixed transaction cost or the market impact increases; both the start-to-trade threshold and the trade-down-to target decrease as the interest rate or the level of competition increases.
Finally, our results show that, with market impact and transaction costs, the expected discounted arbitrage trading profit is finite and it is optimal for the arbitrageur not to trade immediately when trading is profitable. However, when competitors who find the arbitrage opportunity start to trade and decrease the arbitrage opportunity's value, the arbitrageur will trade sooner, which might in turn make other competitors trade sooner and finally return the traditional solution. We provide a new perspective on the existing empirical literature testing for the existence of arbitrage opportunities. The arbitrage opportunity's value can far exceed the "transaction cost" band, long or short, until some arbitrageur starts to trade, after which the arbitrage opportunity's value might again recover to a high level if this arbitrageur is the only one to find the arbitrage opportunity or gradually jump to the "transaction cost" band and remain nearby due to several competitors' mutually excited trade.
